Lido (liquid staking)
DAO-governed liquid staking for ETH: mint transferable stETH and pay a flat 10% fee on staking rewards.
Short answer: Community ownership replaces the operator with a protocol, a DAO and a treasury. You trade recourse for transparency and censorship resistance - governance is the product, and reading the upgrade path matters more than reading the rate card.
providers on this page: 4 · status active: 100% · facts verified by us: 100% · publish independent proof: 100%
quick picks
DAO-governed liquid staking for ETH: mint transferable stETH and pay a flat 10% fee on staking rewards.
Ethereum's .eth naming protocol: NFT-owned names with per-year, length-tiered pricing and broad wallet/browser resolution.
Decentralised liquid staking via rETH with permissionless node operators and a ~14% pool commission settled on-chain.
The original .bit naming chain (2011): on-chain names for a 0.01 NMC fee plus transaction fee, merge-mined with Bitcoin.
"Community-owned" is both the most honest and the most elastic label in infrastructure. At its best it means what Lido and Rocket Pool built: protocols where governance is published, parameters are on-chain, and no company can close your account. At its worst it is a token attached to a company. The four live protocols in this population are the real thing - 4 rows, all with published governance artifacts, 100% of them requiring no identity at any point - and this page maps what governance actually gives you and what it cannot.
The trade you make with community ownership [3][4]:
The recurring question in this category: if the community owns it, why am I still paying? Because node operators, audits and development are real costs, and community ownership changes who is accountable for them - not whether they exist [3][4]:
| Provider | From | Min stake | Fee | KYC | Verification | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lido (liquid staking) | n/a | n/a | 10% | none | n/a | 8.1 |
| Ethereum Name Service (ENS) | $5 per year | n/a | n/a | none | n/a | 7.9 |
| Rocket Pool | n/a | n/a | 14% | none | n/a | 7.7 |
| Namecoin | n/a | n/a | n/a | none | n/a | 6.8 |
Live from our database - caveats and sources in each linked review.
The model has real failure modes, and they are not hypothetical [3][4]:
If your threat model fears companies more than committees, this population is the right side of the trade. If the reverse, the company operators in the staking hub give you a counterparty and an SLA - a legitimate choice, not a concession.
Three artifacts separate working governance from governance branding [3]:
The open-source hub covers the code side of the same question - and the two overlap heavily here, because in this population the license and the governance are the same trust model viewed from different angles. 0 operators from this vertical sit in our archive; none of the four live protocols above are there, and the reason is visible in their governance artifacts: 100% of the rows carry facts we verified ourselves, and all four publish the process behind their parameters.
Governance parameters - fees, upgrades, treasury spending, protocol parameters. It does not control node reliability day to day, and it does not give you a counterparty to sue. The governance model replaces the contract, not the risk.
Different. Smart-contract risk replaces counterparty risk; upgrade paths replace business decisions. Lido's candid risk disclosure is the honest template - read it and ask whether you are equipped to evaluate smart-contract risk.
Who funds development, from what assets, and with what guardrails. A DAO treasury is a pool of money controlled by governance - the honest question is what stops it from being drained by vote.
Because node operators and development are real costs. Lido's 10% and Rocket Pool's roughly 14% commission pay operator infrastructure - the difference is who profits and who the fee is accountable to.
Most DAO contracts are upgradeable - meaning governance can change the rules your deposit sits behind. A DAO-upgradeable contract is a promise with a procedure, not a law of nature.
Not automatically. It trades corporate failure risk for governance capture risk, and both are real. The right choice depends on whether your threat model fears companies or committees more.
Opposite ends of the trade space - Namecoin has no company, no recurring fee and thin liquidity; ENS has deep integration, yearly rent and a treasury. Choose by what you need the name to survive.
You fork, you exit, or you organize. Exit paths differ per protocol - liquid-staking tokens exit at market price, name registries require moving your resolvers. Know the exit before the vote, not after.
Three artifacts - published risk documentation, on-chain parameter history, and a real treasury view. The protocols that publish all three are the ones where governance is a working system rather than a label.
It protects against specific failures - company bankruptcy, unilateral account closure - and exposes you to others: smart-contract bugs, governance capture, slow crisis response. It is a different failure set, not a smaller one.